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THE SOCIAL AND MORAL COGNITION OF 
GROUP AGENTS 
Bertram F. Malle* 
INTRODUCTION 
To better understand the possibility, scope, and limits of 
punishment for groups we must understand how humans 
conceptualize group agents, interpret their actions, and make moral 
judgments about them.  In this article I therefore examine the 
social-cognitive foundations for human perceptions of groups and 
the moral evaluations of their conduct. Part I identifies the 
conceptual framework within which people perceive, interpret, and 
reason about individual agents. Part II examines whether people 
apply the same framework to cognitions of group agents. Part III 
introduces the psychological system that accomplishes people’s 
moral judgments of individual agents. Part IV explores whether 
people equally apply this system to moral judgments of group 
agents. Finally, Part V discusses the limits of perceiving groups as 
moral agents—limits that the perceiver may feel more painfully 
than the agent.  
I. SOCIAL COGNITION: THE CASE OF INDIVIDUALS 
The ultimate goal of this article is to explore how groups can 
be targets of moral cognition. Moral cognition, however, is deeply 
embedded in social cognition, so my first concern is to identify 
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core constituents of social cognition—of both individuals and 
groups—that provide a foundation for moral cognition.1 My focus 
will be on three such constituents: judgments of intentionality, 
behavior explanations, and ascriptions of mental states. These 
phenomena will reveal a fascinating complexity of social cognition 
that translates into a similar complexity of moral cognition. The 
key question will be whether this complexity extends from 
individual to group agents.   
A. Fundamental Concepts: Agency and Intentionality  
Humans perceive people, and interactions among them, 
through a framework that conceptualizes behavior as 
fundamentally linked with mental states. This framework, 
variously called common-sense psychology, folk psychology, or 
theory of mind consists of two parts: (a) systems that filter, 
organize, and integrate certain stimulus inputs into such concepts 
or categories as agent, intention, belief, and reason;2 and (b) 
                                                          
1 I should emphasize that social cognition encompasses a broader set of 
concepts, capacities, and activities than I will investigate here. For reviews see 
Bertram F. Malle, Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Human 
Social Cognition, in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS 225 (Ran Hassin et al. eds., 2005) 
[hereinafter Malle in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS]; Bertram F. Malle, The 
Fundamental Tools, and Possibly Universals, of Social Cognition, in 
HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION ACROSS CULTURES 267 (Richard 
Sorrentino & Susumu Yamaguchi eds., 2008) [hereinafter Malle in HANDBOOK 
OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION]. Among the capacities and processes I will set 
aside we find face recognition, gaze following, mimicry, automatic empathy, 
joint attention, imitation, simulation, and perspective taking. I will also say little 
about the vast literature on stereotyping because its focus is on the perception of 
individuals as group members, not the perception of groups. The actual social-
psychological literature on group perception will be well covered by Steve 
Sherman and Elise Percy’s article, The Psychology of Collective Responsibility: 
When and Why Collective Entities are Likely to be Held Responsible for the 
Misdeeds of Individual Members, 18 J.L. & POL’Y forthcoming (2010).  
2 See generally Roy D’Andrade, A Folk Model of the Mind, in CULTURAL 
MODELS IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 112 (Dorothy Holland & Naomi Quinn 
eds., 1987); Yoshihisa Kashima, Allison McIntyre & Paul Clifford, The 
Category of the Mind: Folk Psychology of Belief, Desire, and Intention, 1 ASIAN 
J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 289 (1989); Alan M. Leslie, A Theory of Agency, in CAUSAL 
COGNITION: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DEBATE 121 (Dan Sperber, et al. eds., 
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assumptions about these categories and their relationships.3  
This conceptual framework is distinct from the variety of 
psychological processes that solve social-cognitive tasks—such as 
action parsing, gaze following, simulation, or inference. These 
processes have distinct evolutionary and developmental paths, and 
they operate within the conceptual framework.4 Gaze following, 
for example, exists in other primates, but its connection to 
inferences of mental states such as seeing, appears to emerge only 
in humans.5 The entire package of conceptual framework plus the 
suite of psychological processes that operate within it make up the 
larger phenomenon of human social cognition.6  
The central categories of the folk theory of mind are arguably 
agent, intentionality, and mind, and they are closely related to one 
another.7 Agents are entities that can act intentionally; intentional 
actions require a particular involvement of the mind; and only 
agents have minds. This web of concepts is anchored in specific 
perceptual-cognitive processes emerging in the first year of life. 
Infants quickly identify agents from a few central cues, including 
faces, self-propelled motion, and contingent interaction with the 
perceiver.8 Having identified an agent, human perceivers are 
                                                          
1995); Bertram F. Malle & Joshua Knobe, The Folk Concept of Intentionality, 
33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 101 (1997) [hereinafter Folk Concept of 
Intentionality]; BERTRAM F. MALLE, HOW THE MIND EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR: 
FOLK EXPLANATIONS, MEANING, AND SOCIAL INTERACTION (MIT Press 2004) 
[hereinafter HOW THE MIND EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR]. 
3 See generally JERRY A. FODOR, MODULARITY OF THE MIND (1983); Malle 
in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS, supra note 1; Adam Morton, Folk Psychology is not 
a Predictive Device, 105 MIND 119 (1996); Henry M. Wellman & Jacqueline D. 
Woolley, From Simple Desires to Ordinary Beliefs: The Early Development of 
Everyday Psychology, 35 COGNITION 245 (1990).  
4 HOW THE MIND EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR, supra note 2, at ch. 2. 
5 See Daniel J. Povinelli & Timothy J. Eddy, What Young Chimpanzees 
Know About Seeing, 61 MONOGRAPHS SOC’Y FOR RES. CHILD DEV. 122 (1996).  
6 For an introduction to this entire package, see generally Malle in 
HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION, supra note 1.    
7 See generally JAN SMEDSLUND, THE STRUCTURE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL 
COMMON SENSE (1997). 
8 Susan C. Johnson, The Recognition of Mentalistic Agents in Infancy, 4 
TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 22, 25 (2000); see generally David Premack, The 
Infant’s Theory of Self-Propelled Objects, 36 COGNITION 1 (1990).  
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sensitive to facial expression, gaze, and motion patterns that reveal 
the agent’s specific intention underlying the observed behavior.9 
Many linguists count the concepts of agent and intentionality 
as fundamental to the way humans see and talk about the world, 
and, indeed, linguistic forms of these concepts have been found 
across all known languages.10 Developmental research, too, finds 
the concept of intentional agent across all studied cultures.11   
The concept of intentionality guides social cognition from 
infancy on and, through development, reaches a remarkable 
complexity. In adults, the concept encompasses five components 
that refer to distinct mental states and capacities.12 For children, 
acquiring such a complex concept is not an easy feat and is not 
done in one trial. Instead, the child builds up the concept from 
simple beginnings over many years of conceptual and social 
development.13 During the first year of life, infants identify 
intentional behavior by paying close attention to self-propelled 
movement and especially object-directed movement such as 
                                                          
9 See generally Jodie A. Baird & Dare A. Baldwin, Making Sense of 
Human Behavior: Action Parsing and Intentional Inference, in INTENTIONS AND 
INTENTIONALITY: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL COGNITION 193 (Bertram F. Malle, 
et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter INTENTIONS AND INTENTIONALITY]; Winand J. 
Dittrich & S.E.G. Lea, Visual Perception of Intentional Motion, 23 PERCEPTION 
253 (1994); Ann T. Phillips, Henry M. Wellman & Elizabeth S. Spelke, Infants’ 
Ability to Connect Gaze and Emotional Expression to Intentional Action, 85 
COGNITION 53 (2002); Jeffrey M. Zacks, Shawn Kumar, Richard A. Abrams & 
Ritesh Mehta, Using Movement and Intentions to Understand Human Activity, 
112 COGNITION 201 (2009). 
10 See generally JOAN BYBEE ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF GRAMMAR: 
TENSE, ASPECT, AND MODALITY IN THE LANGUAGES OF THE WORLD (1994); 
Talmy Givón, Cause and Control: On the Semantics of Interpersonal 
Manipulation, 4 SYNTAX & SEMANTICS 59 (1975); ANNA WIERZBICKA, 
SEMANTICS: PRIMES AND UNIVERSALS (1996). 
11 See generally Henry M. Wellman & Joan G. Miller, Developing 
Conceptions of Responsive Intentional Agents, 6 J. COGNITION & CULTURE  27 
(2006).  
12 The five components are desire, belief, intention, awareness, and skill. 
See infra Part I.B. 
13 See generally Alison Gopnik & Andrew N. Meltzoff, The Child’s Theory 
of Action, in WORDS, THOUGHTS, AND THEORIES 125 (1997); INTENTIONS AND 
INTENTIONALITY, supra note 9.  
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grasping or putting.14 At the end of the first year, they are able to 
parse streams of behavior, at just the right junctures, into units that 
correspond to initiated or completed intentional actions,15 properly 
taking advantage of eye-gaze and verbal markers (e.g., “oops”).16 
Through the second year, they refine their understanding of an 
agent’s “object-directedness”17 into the first truly mental concept 
of desire. Children recognize that another person can have desires 
different from their own,18 and they infer an agent’s goals even 
from incomplete action attempts.19 Over the next years, children 
acquire the concepts of belief  and intention—the latter of which is 
cleanly differentiated from desire only after the age of five.20  
Developmental change in the folk-psychological framework 
thus occurs primarily as a differentiation of the intentionality 
concept, from a simple behavioral understanding to an increasingly 
rich mentalistic understanding. I now take a closer look at the 
endpoint of this development—the fully-fledged concept of 
                                                          
14 See Amanda L. Woodward, Infants Selectively Encode the Goal Object 
of an Actor’s Reach, 69 COGNITION 1 (1998). 
15 See Dare A. Baldwin, Jodie A. Baird, Megan M. Saylor & M. Angela 
Clark, Infants Parse Dynamic Action, 72 CHILD DEV. 708 (2001); Megan M. 
Saylor et al., Infants’ On-line Segmentation of Dynamic Human Action, 8 J. 
COGNITION & DEV. 113 (2007).  
16 See Malinda Carpenter, Nameera Akhtar & Michael Tomasello, 
Fourteen- Through 18-Month-Old Infants Differentially Imitate Intentional and 
Accidental Actions, 21 INFANT BEHAV. & DEV. 315 (1998). 
17 See Henry M. Wellman & Ann T. Phillips, Developing Intentional 
Understandings, in INTENTIONS AND INTENTIONALITY, supra note 9, at 139–40. 
18 See Betty M. Repacholi & Alison Gopnik, Early Reasoning About 
Desires: Evidence From 14 and 18-Month-Olds, 33 DEV. PSYCHOL. 12 (1997). 
19 Andrew N. Meltzoff, Understanding the Intentions of Others: Re-
enactment of Intended Acts by 18-Month-Old Children, 31 DEV. PSYCHOL. 838, 
842 (1995).  
20 See Jodie A. Baird & Louis J. Moses, Do Preschoolers Appreciate That 
Identical Actions May be Motivated by Different Intentions?, 2 J. COGNITION & 
DEV. 413 (2001). For a review of the developmental path, see generally Janet 
W. Astington, The Paradox of Intention: Assessing Children’s 
Metarepresentational Understanding, in INTENTIONS AND INTENTIONALITY, 
supra note 9.  For the distinction between desire and intention in adults, see 
Bertram F. Malle & Joshua Knobe, The Distinction Between Desire and 
Intention: A Folk-Conceptual Analysis, in INTENTIONS AND INTENTIONALITY, 
supra note 9, at 45. 
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intentionality in adults. 
B. Intentionality: Concept and Judgments 
Over the centuries, philosophers have offered countless 
analyses of the concept of intentionality. But whose concept is it? 
How can we decide, for instance, whether intention is truly 
different from desire? Malle and Knobe investigated empirically 
what ordinary people’s concept of intentionality is.21 After all, 
people use their own folk concept—not any philosopher’s 
idealized model—to solve everyday interaction tasks and make 
moral judgments.22 In a first study, participants read descriptions of 
twenty behaviors and rated them for their intentionality. About one 
half of the participants received no definition of intentionality 
before they made their ratings; the other half did receive such a 
definition (“it means that the person had a reason to do what she 
did and that she chose to do so”). Agreement of intentionality 
ratings across the twenty behaviors was high: on average, any two 
people’s ratings correlated at r = .64, and any one person’s ratings 
correlated at r = .80 with the remaining group. More important, the 
experimenter-provided definition had no effect on agreement. It 
appears that people share a folk concept of intentionality and 
spontaneously use it to judge behaviors.  
Given that there is a shared folk concept of intentionality, what 
components does this concept have? Under what conditions do 
people consider a behavior intentional? As a first pass, Malle and 
Knobe asked people for explicit definitions of intentionality 
(“When you say that somebody performed an action intentionally, 
what does this mean?”). These definitions showed consensus, 
revealing four main components: for an agent to perform a 
behavior intentionally, the agent must have (a) a desire for an 
outcome; (b) a belief that the behavior will lead to that outcome; 
(c) an intention to perform the behavior; and (d) awareness of 
                                                          
21 See generally Folk Concept of Intentionality, supra note 2. 
22 See generally Bertram F. Malle & Sarah E. Nelson, Judging Mens Rea: 
The Tension Between Folk Concepts and Legal Concepts of Intentionality, 21 
BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 563 (2003); Bertram F. Malle, Intentionality, Morality and 
Their Relationship in Human Judgment, 6 J. COGNITION & CULTURE 61 (2006) 
[hereinafter Judgments of Intentionality and Morality]. 
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fulfilling the intention while performing the behavior.   
Malle and Knobe also postulated a fifth component of 
intentionality: skill—or the ability to control and replicate the 
behavior in question (rather than being lucky in somehow 
managing to perform it). They presented participants with stories 
about behaviors and experimentally varied whether evidence for 
certain components was present (among them the agent’s skill).  
They found that for difficult actions, people indeed look for 
evidence of the agent’s skill at controlling the behavior.23   
Malle and Knobe thus proposed a five-component model of the 
folk concept of intentionality, displayed in Figure 1. According to 
this folk concept, the direct cause of an intentional action is the 
mental state of intention. For an intention to be ascribed, at a 
minimum a desire (for an outcome) and a belief (about the action-
outcome link) must be present. For an action to be seen as 
performed intentionally, however, skill and awareness have to be 
present as well. Thus, people distinguish between intention as a 
mental state and intentionality as a property of an action. This two-
layer structure was supported in an additional experiment in which 
belief and desire information was found to be necessary for 
intention ascriptions and, given an intention ascription, skill and 
awareness were found to be necessary for an intentionality 
ascription.24 The five constituents of the folk concept of 
intentionality—belief, desire, intention, skill, and awareness—can 
be reliably found across many different languages and may be 
universal conceptual primitives of the mind.25   
 
 
                                                          
23 This component was likely omitted from people’s explicit definitions 
because people focused on social behaviors, for which skill is almost always 
assumed, rather than artistic, athletic or otherwise difficult behaviors, for which 
skill may not be as readily assumed.  
24 Folk Concept of Intentionality, supra note 2, at 109–11 (Study 3). 
25 Wierzbicka, supra note 10, at 36–38. Wierzbicka’s list of such 
conceptual primitives does not distinguish intentions from desires, but other 
linguistic work provides evidence for the unique role of intentions. Bybee has 
shown that, across countless and diverse languages, intending and the future 
tense are tightly connected, something that we don’t see for desire or goal 
concepts. See generally Bybee, supra note 10. 
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                    Belief                      Desire 
                                                
                   Skill           Intention         Awareness 
                                                       
                                   Intentionality 
 
Figure 1.  A model of the folk concept of intentionality.26  
 
1. Two Forms of Intentionality Judgments  
Even though the concept of intentionality consists of five 
components and people are sensitive to the presence or absence of 
each of these components, we should not expect people to 
deliberate about these five components each time they judge a 
behavior as intentional. They are likely to consider carefully each 
of the components if uncertainty or the weight of the judgment 
demands it, but we can expect people to use a more efficient path 
to assess intentionality in everyday situations. This more efficient 
path is configural, fast, and often unconscious; it develops earlier, 
and evolved longer ago. The former, more deliberate path searches 
for and weighs information; it is slower, often conscious, develops 
later, and evolved more recently.27 Evidence for these two paths is 
largely indirect, but it is convincing nonetheless.  
Many animals can quickly recognize predator actions. These 
naturally intentional actions look a certain way, and the prey makes 
a configural judgment about such an attacking action.28  The animal 
                                                          
26 Figure 1 adapted from The Folk Concept of Intentionality, supra note 2, 
© Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., Inc., with permission. 
27 These two paths may constitute two distinct processes (and neural 
structures) or one process that is variably modulated by other processes (e.g., by 
higher-order executive control).  I have no commitment to one or the other 
version, and there is no current evidence that could decide between the two. 
28 Among goslings, a silhouette that moves in one direction in the sky, 
resembling a hawk, is recognized as a threat whereas the same silhouette 
moving in the opposite direction, resembling a duck, is ignored.  This is a 
configural judgment of the agent’s identity but is nonetheless a powerful 
illustration of fast, configural judgments. See generally Nora Canty & James L. 
Gould, The Hawk/Goose Experiment: Sources of Variability, 50 ANIMAL 
BEHAV. 1091 (1995). 
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is unlikely to make a literal distinction between intentional and 
unintentional behavior, but a structure exists within the animal that 
responds to certain configurations of movement that are intentional 
actions and does not respond to others. We also know that apes 
distinguish between behavior patterns that reveal something about 
the agent’s intentions and behavior patterns that are apparently 
accidental.29 Further, the detection of mirror neurons in monkeys 
suggests that some of this capacity to recognize intentional action 
comes from the immediate interconnection between the perception 
of another’s action and the perceiver’s own motor program for this 
action.30 Such mirror neurons fire both when the monkey sees 
someone crack a nut and when the monkey cracks a nut itself.31 
Thus, if the animal perceives a certain intentional behavior, then its 
own triggered motor program will be intentional as well, which 
provides a “tag” for the perceived behavior to be intentional. On 
this account, perceivers can easily recognize intentional actions 
that they themselves are capable of performing but not actions that 
they themselves are not yet capable of performing. Research on 3- 
to 6-month-old infants indeed shows this to be the case.32  
Languages also code for intentionality, in lexicon or morphology, 
and listeners can decode this feature in a split second. For example, 
we immediately know the difference between a person saying “I 
slept in” or “I overslept.” Finally, recent work in our lab has shown 
that intentionality judgments of basic human actions are made very 
fast and are largely independent of other judgments (such as of 
goals, beliefs, and personality).33 
                                                          
29 See Josep Call & Michael Tomasello, Distinguishing Intentional From 
Accidental Actions in Orangutans (Pongo Pygmaeus), Chimpanzees (Pan 
Troglodytes), and Human Children (Homo Sapiens), 112 J. COMP. PSYCHOL. 
192 (1998). 
30 See generally Giacomo Rizzolatti & Laila Craighero, The Mirror-Neuron 
System, 27 ANN. REV. NEUROSCI. 169 (2004).    
31 This is true for other sensory modalities as well, such as hearing a nut 
being cracked. See Evelyne Kohler et al., Hearing Sounds, Understanding 
Actions: Action Representation in Mirror Neurons, 297 SCI. 846 (2002). 
32 See Jessica A. Sommerville et al., Action Experience Alters 3-Month-Old 
Infants’ Perception of Others’ Actions, 96 COGNITION B1 (2005). 
33 Jess Holbrook, The Time Course of Social Perception: Inferences of 
Intentionality, Goals, Beliefs, and Traits From Behavior (2006) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon) (on file with author).  Bertram F. 
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Evidence for the more deliberate path comes in part from 
adults’ debates over ambiguous actions, such as in the jury box, 
but also in daily life, such as when a person ponders whether a 
colleague who didn’t invite him to the conference did so 
intentionally or just failed to think of it. People seek evidence for 
specific components if they are ambiguous or missing,34 which 
implies a refined conceptual network and probably requires 
language as well as school-age maturity. This we don’t find in 
other primates, who can identify intentional action but, according 
to extant evidence, do not have mentalistic concepts of desire, 
belief, and intention.35 This is consistent with the general 
assumption that chimpanzees are similar to 2-year-olds, who are at 
the transition from a sophisticated behavioral to a mentalistic 
understanding of intentional action. 
Judgments of intentionality play a central role in many social 
cognitive activities. The following section reviews one of the most 
important ones: how people explain behavior.  In particular, we 
will see how people ascribe the mental states of beliefs and desires 
to an agent in order to make sense of her behavior. The unique way 
in which beliefs and desires are seen as the agent’s reasons 
constitute a hallmark of the folk theory of mind and behavior. 
Consequently, this hallmark will become a test case (in Part II of 
this article) for how similar the social cognition of groups is to the 
social cognition of individuals.   
                                                          
Malle & Jess Holbrook, Is There a Hierarchy of Social Inference? Evidence 
From a New Experimental Paradigm (June 2008) (unpublished paper presented 
at the Society of Philosophy & Psychology 34th Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, 
PA) (on file with author).  
34 Angela Laurita, The Concept of Intentionality Underlying People’s 
Judgments of Criminal Behavior (2006) (unpublished Honor’s thesis, University 
of Oregon) (on file with author). For a summary, see Judgments of Intentionality 
and Morality, supra note 22, at 71–72. 
35 See generally Derek C. Penn & Daniel J. Povinelli, On the Lack of 
Evidence That Chimpanzees Possess Anything Remotely Resembling a ‘Theory 
of Mind,’ 362 PHIL. TRANS. OF ROYAL SOC. BAR 731 (2007). For a more 
optimistic view, see generally Josep Call & Michael Tomasello, Does the 
Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind? 30 Years Later, 12 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE 
SCI. 187 (2008). 
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C. Core Application of Intentionality: Behavior Explanations 
The complex folk concept of intentional action is most clearly 
revealed when we examine how people explain such actions. As 
Heider noted, people’s explanations look quite different for 
unintentional and intentional behaviors.36 They explain 
unintentional behaviors by referring to “mechanical” causal factors 
(e.g., emotions, traits, others’ behaviors, physical events), and we 
may label these cause explanations. In such explanations, people 
presuppose nothing but a straightforward cause-effect relation; 
there is no role for notions of intention or awareness. For example, 
“I almost failed my exams ‘cause I didn’t really prepare for them” 
(not preparing caused failing) or “A friend cried on the phone 
because she felt unloved” (feeling unloved caused crying). 
In contrast, explanations of intentional behavior are far more 
complex, involving assumptions of awareness, rationality, and 
intentional control. In fact, people use three distinct “modes” of 
explaining intentional behavior, and two are important for our 
purposes here: reason explanations and causal history of reason 
explanations.37 I now describe them in sufficient detail to explore 
their role in explanations of group behaviors in Part II of this 
article.38  
                                                          
36 FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 100 
(Wiley 1958). Heider’s work has often been misinterpreted in the very literature 
that followed his lead. See Bertram F. Malle & William Ickes, Fritz Heider: 
Philosopher and Psychologist, in 4 PORTRAITS OF PIONEERS IN PSYCHOLOGY 
193 (Gregory A. Kimble & Michael Wertheimer eds., 2000); See also generally 
Bertram F. Malle, Fritz Heider’s Legacy: Celebrated Insights, Many of Them 
Misunderstood, 39 SOC. PSYCHOL. 163 (2008). 
37 The third, and relatively rare, mode of explaining intentional action 
refers to factors that enabled the action to come about as it was intended. See 
Bertram F. Malle et al., Conceptual Structure and Social Functions of Behavior 
Explanations: Beyond Person–Situation Attributions, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 309 (2000) [hereinafter Conceptual Structure]; John McClure & 
Denis Hilton, For You Can’t Always Get What You Want: When Preconditions 
Are Better Explanations Than Goals, 36 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 223 (1997). 
38 For more detailed analyses, see Bertram F. Malle, How People Explain 
Behavior: A New Theoretical Framework, 3 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
REV. 21 (1999) [hereinafter How People Explain Behavior]; see also Conceptual 
Structure, supra note 37, at 310–15; HOW THE MIND EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR, 
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1. Reason Explanations  
Reason explanations are the most frequently used mode, and 
they reflect the core of the intentionality concept—the reasoning 
process that leads from belief and desire to an intention. This 
process, according to people’s folk theory, occurs when an agent 
decides to act in light of and on the grounds of those beliefs and 
desires, which makes those beliefs and desires the reasons for 
which she acted.   
An agent decides to act in light of certain beliefs or desires if 
the agent consciously considered them when deciding to act. This 
“subjectivity” assumption39 is the first defining feature of reason 
explanations: they are designed to capture the agent’s subjective 
viewpoint, to reconstruct the agent’s actual beliefs and desires that 
shaped her intention. 
An agent decides to act on the grounds of certain beliefs or 
desires if the agent saw them as reasonable grounds for deciding to 
so act. This “rationality” assumption40 is the second defining 
feature of reason explanations: they have to hang together so as to 
offer justification for the reasonableness and comprehensibility of 
the intention or action. For example, when an explainer claims, 
“Anne invited Ben to dinner because he had fixed her car,” then 
the explainer must presume that Anne actually considered Ben’s 
fixing her car when deciding to invite him and saw his fixing her 
car as reasonable grounds for inviting him.   
2. Causal History of Reason (CHR) Explanations  
Even though people explain most intentional behaviors by 
reference to the agent’s reasons, they explain some of them by 
pointing to factors that lay in the causal history of those reasons 
but were not themselves reasons. These causal history of reason 
(CHR) explanations can cite the agent’s unconscious mental states, 
                                                          
supra note 2, at ch. 4–5.    
39 How People Explain Behavior, supra note 38, at 36; HOW THE MIND 
EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR, supra note 2, at 92–93. 
40 How People Explain Behavior, supra note 38, at 36–37; HOW THE MIND 
EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR, supra note 2, at 93. 
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personality, upbringing, culture, and the immediate context.41 
Whereas reason explanations try to capture what the agent herself 
considered and weighed when deciding to act, CHR explanations 
take a step back and try to capture what led up to the agent’s 
reasons in the first place. For example, when clarifying why Kim 
didn’t vote, an explainer might say “She is lazy” or “Her whole 
family is apolitical.” Both statements help explain Kim’s action, 
but they do not pick out Kim’s subjective reasons for not voting. 
Causal history of reason explanations explain an intentional action 
by citing causal antecedents to the agent’s reasoning and her 
decision to act, but there is no assumption that the agent actively or 
rationally considered those antecedents in her reasoning process. 
Hence, when an explainer states that “Kim didn’t vote because she 
is lazy,” he does not imply that Kim reasoned: “I am lazy; 
therefore I shouldn’t vote.”  
In Part II of this article I examine the social cognition of groups 
with a particular focus on the concept of intentional agency, the 
explanation of action by reasons, and the types of mental states that 
are (or are not) attributed to group agents.   
II. SOCIAL COGNITION OF GROUP AGENTS 
The Ventura County Community College District, the Ventura County 
Fire Protection District, and the Ventura County Sheriff’s Department 
intend to pool their resources 
(Los Angeles Times) 
 
Giant has offered a buyout to its highest-paid workers in an effort to 
save on labor costs 
(Washington Post) 
 
Wimbledon simply did not know what had hit them and if this was 
Arsenal’s reminder to Manchester United that they intend to fight to 
retain their title to the last 
(Irish Times) 
 
                                                          
41 How People Explain Behavior, supra note 38, at 32-35; HOW THE MIND 
EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR, supra note 2, at ch. 4, especially 102–09; Conceptual 
Structure, supra note 37, at 311–15. 
108 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Sea Bright officials initially opposed the sand-pumping program 
because they thought their town would be inundated with out-of-
towners 
(Washington Post) 
 
What should we make of such statements? At least at the 
linguistic surface they are ascriptions of intentional actions, 
intentions, knowledge, beliefs, and desires to group agents.  Such 
ascriptions can be found with ease in speech and print.42   
But are they not just metaphors? A sharp critic of 
“collectivism” writes, “The fact that we attribute intentional 
qualities to groups does not imply that those groups have real 
intentions. The intention we attribute to groups is metaphorical.”43 
This criticism, however, is flawed in two respects. First, it makes 
the empirical claim that “we” (people, I presume) attribute mental 
states to groups metaphorically, but no empirical evidence is 
offered for this claim.44 Second, the author apparently distinguishes 
between the practice of (metaphorically) ascribing intentions (or 
other mental states) to groups and some objective way in which 
groups don’t literally have intentions. But what constitutes this 
objective reality? If most humans see no problem in ascribing 
intentions to groups, what is the scholar to say? “You are all 
wrong!” Or perhaps “You don’t know what the concept of 
                                                          
42 Austen Clark, Beliefs and Desires Incorporated, 91 J. PHIL. 404, 404 
(1994); Paul Bloom & Csaba Veres, The Perceived Intentionality of Groups, 71 
COGNITION B1, B2 (1999); Bryce Huebner, Michael Bruno & Hagop Sarkissian, 
What Does the Nation of China Think About Phenomenal States?, 1 REV. PHIL. 
PSYCH. 225, 226 (2010). 
43 Manuel Velasquez, Debunking Corporate Moral Responsibility, 13 BUS. 
ETHICS Q. 531, 545–46 (2003).  
44Adam Arico, Brian Fiala, Robert Goldberg & Shaun Nichols, Folk 
Psychology of Consciousness (unpublished manuscript under review) 
(manuscript at n.9) available at http://www.u.arizona.edu/~arico/FPC.pdf. Arico 
and colleagues report evidence from pilot studies that people do not mean to be 
“metaphorical” in their ascriptions of mind attribution. The researchers found 
that ordinary people take statements such as “Some corporations want lower 
taxes” to be literally true. On a scale from 1 (figuratively true) to 7 (literally 
true), their ratings averaged 6.1. E-mail from Adam Arico, Dep’t of Phil., Univ. 
of Arizona, to Bertram F. Malle, Professor of Psychol., Brown Univ. (June 19, 
2010) (on file with author).   
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intention means!” In actuality, it is the scholar who is confused 
about the concept of intention. Given that there is a folk concept of 
intention, scholarly work must determine when and why people 
ascribe mental states to groups using that concept. If a scholar 
would like to adopt a different concept of intention, based perhaps 
on an alleged neural substrate, he or she would have to argue for it 
but should better call it something else (e.g., neurointention). 
People would continue to ascribe intentions to groups, and if they 
learned what the scholar means by neurointention, they may 
refrain from ascribing neurointentions to groups. 
I therefore continue to assume that when people ascribe a 
mental state to a group they literally ascribe that state to the group. 
The question is just what this literal meaning of mental states 
amounts to.  
As with most folk concepts of the mind,45 people are, in 
philosophers’ language, functionalists. They ascribe mental states 
not by looking for a physical substrate but by integrating 
perceptual cues (e.g., eyes, contingent behavior), categorical 
assumptions (e.g., agents can act intentionally and have minds), 
and context information. People envision “minds” in most animals, 
gods, aliens, and computers if at least some of those conditions are 
met: cues (e.g., biological motion triggering the expectation of 
mental states); assumptions (e.g., that gods and aliens must be like 
humans, just more so); and context (e.g., companies make 
decisions and so are likely to deliberate). Because of the flexibility 
of their concepts of agency, intentionality, and mentality, people 
certainly have no difficulty ascribing minds to groups.46  However, 
                                                          
45 See generally Folk Concept of Intentionality, supra note 2; Andrew E. 
Monroe & Bertram F. Malle, From Uncaused Will to Conscious Choice: The 
Need to Study, Not Speculate About, People’s Folk Concept of Free Will, 1 REV. 
PHIL. & PSYCHOL. 211 (2010); D’Andrade, supra note 2.  
46 Some scholars reject the notion of group intentionality because 
collectives don’t “exist” the way individuals do; they have no bodies, hence no 
minds. See, eg., John Hasnas, Where is Felix Cohen When We Need Him?: 
Transcendental Nonsense and the Moral Responsibility of Corporations, 18 J.L. 
& POL’Y  (forthcoming 2010). All we see are individuals who act on “the 
group’s behalf.” But in this sense “I” don’t really act either; all we see is my arm 
that moves the bottle and my legs that bring the arm close enough for it to move 
the bottle. My arm and my leg would then act “on my behalf.” But individual 
agents get things done in a variety of ways, with the help of a variety of organic 
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they are not indiscriminate in those ascriptions. In fact, there is an 
important distinction between two kinds of “group agents” that 
people (and, increasingly, scholars) make.  
A. Two Types of Groups 
To adequately examine the social perception of group agents 
we must distinguish between two types of groups:47 (a) aggregate 
groups, in which the members of a group or collective all perform 
the same action but do so independently (e.g., “Many New Yorkers 
went to the Kandinsky retrospective at the Guggenheim”); and (b) 
jointly acting groups, in which the members of a group act together 
as a single agent (e.g., “The Tribeca Art Club went to the 
Kandinsky retrospective at the Guggenheim”).   
The label aggregate group48 captures well the fact that a 
perceiver literally aggregates the members of this group into a 
(linguistic) group category, such as “men,” “high school seniors,” 
or “Irish peasants.” There is no assumption of interaction, 
communication, or planning among members of aggregate groups. 
Therefore, when we say, “With a sluggish labor market, college 
graduates seriously consider post-secondary education to avert 
unemployment,” we mean that each graduate considers this option 
alone but that many of them do so. In this sense, an aggregate 
group is not an agent but a collection of agents. 
Jointly acting groups engage together in deliberation, decision, 
planning, and (often) action. In this process, not only does each 
individual member undergo certain mental states, but the group 
decides and acts “as one.” Examples include a department faculty 
deciding on a candidate’s promotion, a design team settling on a 
product proposal, or a family planning a vacation. Here, 
interaction, communication, and cognitive sharing among members 
                                                          
and inorganic aids, so we have to be equally tolerant of groups getting things 
done in a variety of ways. 
47 Matthew J. O’Laughlin & Bertram F. Malle, How People Explain 
Actions Performed by Groups and Individuals, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 33, 38–39 (2002).   
48 French proposed a similar label for this type of group: “aggregate 
collectivities.” PETER FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 5 
(1984).   
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are critically implied. Therefore, when we say, “With a sluggish 
labor market, the board seriously considers furloughs to avert job 
loss,” we mean that the board as a whole considers this option 
(even if some individual board members may be quiet or may not 
share the group’s concerns).   
This second group type meets Pettit’s requirement of genuine 
intentional group agency—namely, that a group agent must have 
reasons and form intentions to act.49 As we have seen, the key 
element in intentional agency is the belief-desire-intention (BDI) 
reasoning process—that is, the transition from beliefs and desires 
to intentions (and eventually actions). Normally these transitions 
occur at the individual level (in a person’s mind), but for a group 
agent they must occur at the group level.50 Thus, it is the group 
that has desires and beliefs, and forms intentions. Rather than 
allowing each group member to go through his or her individual 
reasoning process and then somehow aggregating the output of 
those processes into a collective intention to act, the group itself 
must identify a desired goal, collate the relevant beliefs, check for 
compatibility with other beliefs, desires, and already planned 
actions, and then form a proper intention to rationally pursue the 
goal. The individual members may not be unanimous in adopting 
the beliefs, desires, and intention; but whatever procedure (e.g., 
majority voting) licenses the group to instantiate those states, that 
procedure has to occur at each step of the reasoning process. 
Figure 2 exemplifies the process of joint group reasoning. 
 
 Desire to hire 
somebody now? 
Belief that P.P. is  
the best candidate? 
Belief that P.P. is 
available? 
 
 
Group 
Individuals  
        ✔ 
(5/6 majority) 
        ✔ 
(4/6 majority) 
        ✔ 
(4/6 majority) 
              Result: Group intention to offer the job to P.P. 
Figure 2.  The reasoning process from desires and beliefs to 
intentions for a group-level agent 
                                                          
49 Philip Pettit, Collective Intentions, in INTENTION IN LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY 241, 241–42 (Ngaire Naffine, Rosemary Owens, & John Williams 
eds., 2001) [hereinafter Pettit in INTENTION IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY]. 
50 See generally MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS (1989). 
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At each point of the deliberation when there is room for 
disagreement, the group needs to say: “We believe, on the whole, 
that X” or “We want, on the whole, that Y.” Specific procedures 
thus have to be put in place that count as the group wanting, 
believing, and intending something.  Without such procedures, the 
group agent never emerges (there are only a number of individuals 
who try to figure out what others want and think), and any social 
perceiver will also be unlikely to treat the group as a joint agent.   
Consider a Dean who wants to know whether the department 
endorses job candidate A or job candidate B. If the department 
chair said, “The faculty like A better,” the Dean would retort, “Are 
you reporting on a general preference or have you voted in a 
faculty meeting?” That is, a mere distribution of individual 
preferences cannot count as the group’s preference or the group’s 
decision. Moreover, no member of jointly acting groups, not even 
the “leader,” can form an intention for the group to do something; 
it has to be the group (according to its procedures) that makes the 
decisions.51 
To illustrate the force and distinctness of such group-level 
intentional action, Pettit52 discusses paradoxical situations in which 
a group jointly forms an intention to act even though an 
aggregation of individual reasoning (e.g., each faculty member 
making a decision in his or her office alone) would have led to 
rejecting the intention. This can occur when many group members 
lacked just one premise of the reasoning process and therefore 
wouldn’t individually adopt the intention. Returning to Figure 2, if 
member 1 was lacking the desire, members 2 and 3 were missing 
                                                          
51 In larger groups and with more complex actions, the decision process 
often requires distribution of partial subplans across individuals. Not all 
members have all the relevant desires, beliefs, and knowledge for implementing 
the overarching goal; even what constitutes the action may be distributed over 
time and space. But the same is true for individuals. Moving to the U.S. was an 
action I performed in 1990 (and not just at the moment the plane touched down 
at San Francisco International Airport), and deciding and planning to do so 
extended over almost two years and many locations. But this distribution does 
not disqualify me from being the author of that planning, that action.   
52 Pettit in INTENTION IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 49, at 244–47. 
See also Philip Pettit, Groups with Minds of their Own, in SOCIALIZING 
METAPHYSICS 167, 170–72 (Frederick F. Schmitt ed., 2003). 
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the first belief, and member 4 was missing the second belief, 4 of 
the 6 members would have individually rejected the intention to 
act. But in the case of genuine group reasoning, individuals 
subsume their doubts at any given stage under the properly 
licensed group reasons and therefore are bound to support the 
group action.53   
The subordination of individual group members to the group 
intention (and action) is a key feature that distinguishes collective 
agency from merely in-step multiples of individual actions, or a set 
of individual intentions that are in agreement. Arnold, following 
French,54 highlights the normative feature of decision rules that 
groups adhere to (and that individual group members abide by).55 
Once a department, board of directors, or Congress arrives at a 
decision “in a manner consistent with the procedural norms,”56 the 
department, board, or Congress really has an intention to act a 
certain way even if not all members identify with the intention. 
But when does subordination become noninvolvement? If most 
members of a group don’t know and don’t care about the issue and 
if the decision rules do not include a quorum, it becomes 
questionable whether the voting among 10% of the group should 
count as the intention of the whole group. Social perceivers may 
doubt the very fabric of this group agent, criticize the decision 
rules, and treat the intention not as one endorsed by the group but 
by an elite within the group. The tyranny of a ruling elite should 
not be taken as a nation’s will, and when a “State” declares war on 
another, we should always ask who exactly had the aggressive 
intent and what the constituents and boundaries of that group agent 
                                                          
53 Interestingly, many groups still vote on the last stage—the forming of the 
group intention. They could omit this step if they strictly followed the group 
reasoning process because the conclusion would logically follow from the 
premises. But there are other reasons why such a vote is helpful (e.g., 
establishing mutual knowledge, mutual commitment, and a public record of the 
intention).  
54 See PETER A. FRENCH, CORPORATE ETHICS (1995). 
55 Denis G. Arnold, Corporate Moral Agency, 30 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 
279, 291 (2006). 
56 These norms will need to foster, among other things, information 
processing within the group that meets requirements of rationality and 
reasoning. For a detailed argument, see Philip Pettit, Rationality, Reasoning and 
Group Agency, 61 DIALECTICA 495 (2007).   
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are.57   
The following sections introduce two test cases for the 
hypothesis that the social cognition of groups is fundamentally 
similar, though not identical, to the social cognition of individuals. 
The first case documents how people explain behaviors performed 
by groups compared with behaviors performed by individuals. The 
second case examines ascriptions of various mental states, 
particularly ascriptions of two basic classes—propositional 
attitudes (e.g., beliefs, desires, intentions) and phenomenal states 
(e.g., feelings, emotions, sensations).   
B. Behavior Explanations 
There is no better domain in which to demonstrate people’s 
commitment to group-level agency than behavior explanations. 
The logic is straightforward. If people consider group agents to act 
intentionally they should explain those actions with reasons—
which is, as we have seen earlier, the dominant mode by which 
people explain individual intentional behavior.58 The use of reason 
explanations for group agents would thus provide evidence for 
both the application of intentionality and the use of mental state 
(belief and desire) ascriptions in making sense of group agent 
behavior.  
1. Do People Use Reason Explanations When Explaining Groups’ 
Behaviors? 
O’Laughlin and Malle devised three experiments in which 
ordinary people explained a variety of behaviors, some performed 
by individuals, some performed by groups.59 These explanations 
                                                          
57 For a discussion, see Larry May, State Aggression, Collective Liability, 
and Individual Mens Rea, 30 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 309, 314–17 (2006). For a 
distinction between larger, amorphous groups, such as the U.S. citizenry as a 
whole, and more tightly organized and epistemically connected groups, such as 
the U.S. Supreme Court, a Board of Directors, or a university department, see J. 
ANGELO CORLETT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT 162–63 (3d ed., 2006). 
58 See discussion supra Part I.C.1. 
59 O’Laughlin & Malle, supra note 47, at 36. The participants were asked 
to explain, in writing, a series of behaviors in the context of a fictitious 
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were classified into reasons and causal history of reason (CHR) 
explanations using the F.Ex coding scheme.60 For ease of 
presentation I report relative percentages of reasons. 
The stimuli were created such that each behavior could be 
presented as having been performed by either an individual or a 
group agent (e.g., “Why did Nina use drugs?” vs. “Why did the 
High School Seniors use drugs?”).   
In Study 1, actions performed by individuals elicited 71% 
reasons whereas actions performed by groups elicited 56% 
reasons. These results suggested two conclusions: first, that people 
do use reasons (i.e., mental states in light of which an agent 
decides to act) when explaining a group’s action; but second, that 
they do so less than when they explain a group agent’s action.61 All 
plural agents in Study 1 were aggregate groups. We therefore 
interpreted the findings by noting that members of aggregate 
groups often have distinct reasons for acting the same way (e.g., 
the various reasons that “young people” may have for not voting). 
Citing all of those reasons would be cumbersome, so a social 
perceiver might do well by offering a CHR factor as a 
parsimonious (if general) explanation, pointing to a background 
that triggered the array of different reasons.   
In Study 2, O’Laughlin and Malle made use of the distinction 
between aggregate groups and jointly acting groups to further 
explore both the general finding that group behaviors elicit a 
substantial rate of reason explanations and the more specific 
finding that this rate of reasons is lower than the one found in 
explanations of individual behavior. The authors’ hypothesis was 
                                                          
conversation with a friend.  The instructions emphasized that participants should 
formulate their explanations based on how they might actually respond within 
the context of such a conversation; “highly technical, or exam-like answers were 
discouraged.” [In each] “conversation excerpt,” the friend always elicited an 
explanation from the participant by asking why the agent performed the 
behavior at issue and participants answered the question by writing on three 
blank lines. Id. 
60 BERTRAM F. MALLE, F.Ex: CODING SCHEME FOR PEOPLE’S FOLK 
EXPLANATIONS OF BEHAVIOR (2010), available at http://research.clps.brown. 
edu/SocCogSci/CodingSchemes.html.  
61 This reduction in reason explanations (and the corresponding increase in 
CHR explanations) for group agents was statistically reliable and explained 18% 
of the variance in explanations. 
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as follows. Jointly acting groups are united by their reasoning from 
beliefs and desires to intentions (see Fig. 2 above). A parsimonious 
(and informative) explanation for their behavior could therefore 
refer to those reasons, so the rate of reason explanations for jointly 
acting group behaviors should be similar to the rate for individual 
behaviors, and both should be higher than the rate for aggregate 
group behaviors. Indeed, the average of the jointly acting groups’ 
reason rate and the individual agents’ reason rate was 76% whereas 
the aggregate groups’ reason rate was 62%.62  However, one 
surprising finding emerged: the reason rate for jointly acting 
groups (81%) was even greater than the rate for individual groups 
(71%). This pattern was replicated in a follow-up study, which 
showed both the drop of reason explanations for aggregate group 
behaviors (46%) relative to the average of individual and jointly 
acting group behaviors (76%) and the even greater rate of reason 
explanations for jointly acting group behaviors (86%) than for 
individual behaviors (66%).   
2. The Hyperagent Hypothesis 
The reported studies document that people have no difficulties 
ascribing mental states qua reasons to whole groups, whether 
aggregate or jointly acting. Thus, social perceivers appear to use 
the same conceptual framework (their folk theory of mind and 
behavior) for explaining group behaviors as they do for explaining 
individual behaviors, and the claim that people credit “plural 
subjects” with minds can hardly be doubted.   
But the reported findings raise the possibility that people see 
jointly acting groups as even more “agentic,” even more driven by 
subjective and rational reasons, than they see individuals. I call this 
the hyperagent hypothesis. Why might groups acquire such a 
hyperagent status? 
First, a jointly acting group’s reasoning process may be 
particularly salient or easily imaginable because joint deliberation 
and joint decision making are the key features people use to 
identify this type of group. Second, a jointly formed group 
                                                          
62 This difference was statistically reliable and explained 13% of the 
variance in explanations. 
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intention has presumably overcome the different interests of 
various group members and might therefore be seen as stronger 
than an individual’s intention. In fact, the subordination of 
individual group members to the group’s intention signals the 
unifying force that the group exerts on individuals. Third, the high 
degree of organization and procedure in jointly acting groups may 
be interpreted as a forceful determination to act.   
These inferred features of salient deliberation, strength of 
intention, and organized action readiness can be exploited when 
social perceivers describe jointly acting groups as menacing and 
powerful. Reason explanations will therefore be particularly likely 
in propaganda against jointly acting groups.63 For example, in 
justifying the impending attack on Poland in 1939, Hitler 
reportedly characterized the Eastern neighbor in the following 
way:  
In spite of treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the 
secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us 
harm.64  
Similarly, an excerpt from an anti-homosexual document 
alleges the tight organization of the “homosexual movement”: 
The homosexual movement is extremely well organised, 
and has made powerful allies and friends who lobby on its 
behalf . . . . 
. . . .  
In recent months, the organised homosexual movement has 
been lobbying vociferously, and sometimes violently, for a 
reduction in the age of consent.65 
In legal contexts, too, a prosecutor may want to emphasize 
coordination (“conspiracy”) among individual defendants 
committing a series of crimes. In a powerful example from history, 
                                                          
63 For a more detailed exposition of this topic, see HOW THE MIND 
EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR, supra note 2, at ch. 8, especially section 8.4. 
64 1 OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS 
CRIMINALITY, NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 391 (1946), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Nazi_Vol-I.pdf.  
65 Alexander Baron, Baron’s Guide to “Gay” Sex: A Primer for Children 
and Young People, THE WEBSITE OF ALEXANDER BARON, http://www.infotext 
manuscripts.org/barons_guide_1.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2010).  
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the Allied prosecutors in the Nürnberg indictments treated the 
principal group of twenty-four Nazi war criminals as 
conspirators—as one jointly acting group 
In order to accomplish their aims and purposes, the Nazi 
conspirators prepared to seize totalitarian control over 
Germany to assure that no effective resistance against them 
could arise within Germany itself.66 
. . . .  
Implementing their “master race” policy, the conspirators 
joined in a program of relentless persecution of the Jews, 
designed to exterminate them.67 
The writers liberally use linguistic expressions of planning 
(“aims and purposes,” “prepared to seize,” “program”) and of 
reasons and goals (“in order to . . .,” “designed to”), underscoring 
the motivation, resolution, and intentionality of the collective 
atrocities. 
C. Mental State Ascriptions 
I now turn to the second test case for the hypothesis that the 
social cognition of groups is fundamentally similar to the social 
cognition of individuals. I examine what kinds of mental states 
people ascribe to groups and whether these states differ in kind 
from the ones people ascribe to individuals.   
We know from the previous section that people explain group 
behaviors with reasons. Reasons are typically desires and beliefs—
what philosophers of mind call propositional attitudes. But what 
about other mental states? Do people feel comfortable ascribing 
such states as fear, love, hearing, and tasting to a group’s mind? 
Note that in this case, ascriptions to aggregate groups (as argued 
earlier) are not much of an issue. For example, “The men felt 
embarrassed when they lost the game” can be easily interpreted as 
saying that each man felt embarrassed; no group mind felt 
embarrassed. Likewise, “The people standing in line turned 
                                                          
66 2 INT’L MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 33 (1947), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/NT_major-war-criminals.html. 
67 Id. at 35. 
 The Social and Moral Cognition of Group Agents 119 
frustrated and impatient because only one counter was open” says 
only that each of the people turned frustrated and impatient. By 
contrast, jointly acting groups are candidates for ascriptions of 
such affective states: Did the BP corporation feel embarrassed over 
its handling of the Gulf oil spill in 2010? And was the U.S. 
government angry at BP?   
1. Different Mental States? 
In classic philosophy of mind work, we find a distinction 
between two main classes of mental states: propositional states 
(e.g., beliefs, desires, intentions) and nonpropositional states (e.g., 
pain, feeling sad, smelling fresh coffee).68 Propositional states are 
understood by many to be “computational”—that is, they could in 
principle be implemented in other media besides the human brain, 
such as in computers or aliens. The other, nonpropositional class of 
states has often been characterized as phenomenal—as having a 
certain experiential quality. Ascriptions of phenomenal states to 
groups may be more restrictive; they may require a certain 
brain/body or a unitary mind for implementation.   
Robbins and Jack proposed that people take a phenomenal 
stance to certain other creatures, and certainly to other human 
beings.69 That means they regard them as a locus of experience and 
ascribe to them a variety of phenomenal states (emotions, moods, 
pains, visual sensations, etc.). This stance is contrasted with the 
intentional stance,70 according to which people ascribe to others a 
variety of propositional states (e.g., belief, desire, intention). One 
key feature of Robbins and Jack’s proposal is that the phenomenal 
stance comes with a consideration of the other creature as having 
moral standing. Ascribing to another the capacity for distress 
comes with a desire to prevent such distress and, in particular, to 
shield the other from potential harm. Thus, the phenomenal stance 
                                                          
68 For an overview of this distinction, see generally David Pitt, Mental 
Representation, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (last updated July 21, 2008), http://plato. 
stanford.edu/entries/mental-representation.   
69 Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack, The Phenomenal Stance, 127 PHIL. 
STUD. 59, 69–70 (2006). 
70 See generally DANIEL C. DENNETT, THE INTENTIONAL STANCE (1987).  
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is “morally compelling.”71 I will return to this potential link 
between ascriptions of phenomenal states and considerations of 
moral standing. 
What evidence is there for the claim that ordinary people make 
a distinction between propositional and phenomenal states? Gray, 
Gray, and Wegner asked participants to ascribe a variety of mental 
states and capacities to different agents.72 The pattern of these 
ascriptions suggested a two-dimensional space: One axis, which 
the authors labeled “Experience,” was constituted primarily by 
phenomenal states (e.g., hunger, fear, pain, pleasure); the other 
axis, which the authors labeled “Agency,” was constituted 
primarily by states of higher cognition (e.g., self-restraint, moral 
judgment, memory, and planning). However, very few 
propositional states were included in the study, and those that were 
(desire, planning) did not cluster together. The results also allow 
for alternative interpretations. The items defining the first axis can 
be understood as capturing unintentional states, and the items 
defining the second axis can be understood as capturing intentional 
states.  Likewise, the first axis can be considered a dimension of 
affect and the second a dimension of cognition. 
2. Different Mental States For Groups? 
Knobe and Prinz conducted a series of studies that explore both 
the distinction between propositional and phenomenal states and 
                                                          
71 Robbins & Jack, supra note 69, at 70.   
72 Heather M. Gray, Kurt Gray & Daniel M. Wegner, Dimensions of Mind 
Perception, 315 SCIENCE 619, 619 (2007). The states included, among others, 
desire, embarrassment, hunger, memory, and morality; the agents included, 
among others, a robot, a frog, a human infant, adult humans, and god. Each 
participant evaluated just one state and indicated for all possible pairs of agents 
whether one agent had more of that state than the other agent (a procedure that 
facilitates between-agent differentiation rather than between-state 
differentiation). The comparative ratings were then aggregated for each agent 
and averaged across people who considered the same state. This resulted in 
mean ratings for thirteen agents on eighteen states. The data analysis was 
unconventional because a principal components analysis (PCA) was run on this 
matrix of thirteen rows and eighteen columns, even though a common 
requirement of PCA is to ensure 5–10 times as many rows as columns.   
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the distinction between individual and group agents.73  The results 
suggested that people are comfortable ascribing propositional 
states (e.g., decide, want, intend, believe, know) to group agents,74 
but that they are reluctant to ascribe phenomenal states to them (a 
sudden urge, great joy, vividly imagining, getting depressed, 
feeling excruciating pain).75 The authors favored a strong 
interpretation of these findings, according to which people 
consider groups to uniquely lack the capacity for “phenomenal 
consciousness.”  The evidence does not strongly support this 
interpretation, however.   
In Knobe and Prinz’s studies, even though people did not deem 
natural such statements as “Acme Corp. is feeling upset,” they 
found it perfectly natural to say “Acme Corp. is upset about the 
court’s recent ruling.”76 It would be a rather unusual conception of 
phenomenal states if one could be in those states but not feel them. 
Fortunately, however, people’s conception does not appear to be 
that unusual. Sytsma and Machery were unable to replicate the 
difference between “feeling upset” and “is upset” (and similarly 
for “regret”).77 More important, for both formulations people on 
average endorsed the midpoint between “sounds clearly weird” and 
“sounds clearly natural”—not exactly evidence for a refusal to 
ascribe phenomenal states to groups. Arico, too, failed to replicate 
the importance of the “feeling” verb, and his participants similarly 
rated the naturalness of phenomenal group states at just above the 
midpoint of the scale.78 These findings support only the contention 
                                                          
73 See Joshua Knobe & Jesse Prinz, Intuitions About Consciousness: 
Experimental Studies, 7 PHENOMENOLOGY & COGNITIVE SCI. 67 (2008).  
74 The group agents in point were Microsoft and Acme Corp. Id. at 74–75.   
75 On a scale of 1–7, where 1 meant “sounds weird” and 7 meant “sounds 
natural,” the propositional states received average ratings between 5 and 7, and 
the phenomenal states received average ratings between 2 and 5. Id. at 75. 
76 Knobe & Prinz, supra note 73, at 77–78. Note that the compared pairs 
differ not only in the presence of the “feeling” verb but also in the provision of 
actual content (being upset about something in particular). Id. Arico did not find 
any difference in naturalness ratings for either of the two differing features. 
Adam Arico, Folk Psychology, Consciousness, and Context Effects, 1 REV. 
PHIL. & PSYCHOL. 371, 379 (2010) [hereinafter Arico, Folk Psychology].   
77 Justin M. Sytsma & Edouard Machery, How to Study Folk Intuitions 
About Phenomenal Consciousness, 22 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 21, 28–30 (2009).  
78 Arico, Folk Psychology, supra note 76, at 379. Arico did find a modest 
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that people are unsure about whether phenomenal states can be 
ascribed to groups, not that they reject them outright or find them 
conceptually incoherent.   
3. Drawing the Right Conclusions 
The current state of evidence is thus highly mixed. On the one 
hand, one might conclude that people treat group agents quite 
similarly to individual agents, all the way to the ascription of many 
(if not all) phenomenal states. There appears to be a subtle 
difference in comfort when ascribing phenomenal states to 
individuals or groups, but that difference is not well understood at 
this point. On the other hand, one might conclude that there is 
really something remarkable about the lesser comfort people have 
when ascribing phenomenal states to groups. It tells us something 
about the uniqueness of group agents, even if this uniqueness has 
fluid boundaries.  
It comes down to the question of how we should explain the 
small but perhaps consistent comfort difference. One hypothesis is 
that it results from the partial semantic fit of mental state terms 
with the physical substrate of groups. For example, people have no 
trouble with group agents wanting or desiring something but are 
more reluctant to ascribe a sudden urge to them.  This may be due 
to specific semantic components being unmet (e.g., urges have 
physiological components whereas desires do not), and the overall 
semantic fit is therefore somewhat reduced when particular verbs 
are ascribed to groups. But if we learned that groups cannot do 
certain things because they lack a (single) body,79 should we 
consider this to be a disappointing insight?   
Such disappointment may be premature. Even though people 
provide intermediate judgments of “naturalness” for verbal 
                                                          
difference in perceived naturalness of group vs. individual mind ascriptions (4.5 
vs. 5.6 on the familiar 1–7 scale). But a variety of nonconceptual factors may 
account for such a modest difference (e.g., frequency of encountering one kind 
of descriptions). Id. at 380. 
79 Sytsma and Machery indeed show that people are highly reluctant to 
ascribe to groups such behavioral attributes as “being murdered,” “napping,” or 
“having insomnia,” all requiring a body.  Sytsma & Machery, supra note 77, at 
26. 
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descriptions of phenomenal states, they still fail to spontaneously 
and frequently attribute such states to group agents. Knobe and 
Prinz claimed, on the basis of a Google search, that virtually no 
instances exist of phrases such as “Microsoft feels angry” or 
“depressed” or “scared,” whereas thousands of instances exist of 
phrases such as “Microsoft decides” or “wants” or “hopes.”80 If 
people are indeed rarely exposed to verbal ascriptions of 
phenomenal states to group agents, the mere mental association 
between such states and groups will be weak, and people may be 
unlikely to search for or infer such states in groups. I call this the 
hypothesis of a reluctant inferential stance.   
4. The Reluctant Inferential Stance 
If people are reluctant to infer a family of affective and 
phenomenal states to groups, an intriguing possibility emerges: a 
group agent who rarely has worries and does not feel pain, who 
cannot be intimidated and has no regrets, will be seen as a 
perfectly self-interested, calculating agent. Even if individual 
members of a group may experience all these states, they are 
dispensable and exchangeable—the group’s structure and 
organization can still maintain its calm rationality. Such an image 
                                                          
80 Knobe & Prinz, supra note 73, at 73–74. The authors don’t provide 
details about their search procedure, so the representativeness of their test is 
difficult to evaluate. I conducted a very brief search with the word pairs 
“Microsoft decide[]” as well as “Microsoft angry” and “Microsoft happy.” 
Already the first results page of each search contained hits. Two sources 
ascribed anger to Microsoft: Trent Nouveau, Microsoft Angry at Google Over 
Vulnerability Disclosure, TG DAILY (June 11, 2010), http://www.tgdaily.com/ 
security-features/50181-microsoft-angry-at-google-over-vulnerability-
disclosure; Microsoft Gets Angry at Yahoo-Google Tie Up, THE INQUIRER (July 
28, 2010), http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/blog-post/1725295/microsoft-
angry-yahoo-google-tie. Three sources ascribed happiness to Microsoft, 
including Roy Schestowitz, Microsoft Happy About Apple’s Invocation of 
Software Patents Against GNU/Linux, TECHRIGHTS (Mar. 16, 2010), 
http://techrights.org/2010/03/16/mobile-linux-victory. However, occurrences of 
“decide” were clearly more frequent overall in my search (about 8/10 per page). 
So people are not conceptually resistant to ascribing phenomenal states to group 
agents, but it is safe to say that people are far less frequently exposed to verbal 
ascriptions of group agents’ phenomenal states. 
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would further contribute to the notion of jointly acting groups 
being hyperagents—agents that display more commitment, exert 
more power, and ultimately pose a greater threat than any 
individual agent could. 
Such an image would have a further consequence.  Agents who 
do not feel worry, regret, or pain are unlikely to be responsive to 
social censoring—to warnings, threats, and punishment. Such 
censoring is of course part and parcel of community members’ 
moral treatment of one another. Therefore, we must ask: How do 
people morally treat a group agent? Are group agents proper 
targets of moral expectations? Moral evaluation? And moral 
punishment? These questions will occupy us in Part III of this 
article.  First I consider people’s moral judgment of individual 
agents.  
III. MORAL JUDGMENT OF INDIVIDUAL AGENTS  
A. Morality Is Embedded in Folk Psychology  
When people make moral judgments about an agent, they 
evaluate the agent’s behavior by considering (a) norms that the 
behavior may have violated and (b) what was in the agent’s mind 
before, while, and even after performing the behavior. The latter 
considerations are a direct reflection of people’s folk theory of 
mind (described in Part I of this article). We can thus say that this 
folk theory lies at the heart of moral judgment.81 
Humans do not normally make moral judgments about 
earthquakes or hurricanes. What makes moral judgments genuinely 
moral is that they are directed at agents who are presumed to be 
capable of following socially shared standards of conduct. Hence, 
the agency concept is a crucial ingredient of moral judgments. 
Specifically, blame is assigned in consideration of an agent’s 
principled capacity to reason about various paths of action and the 
capacity to intentionally pursue one such path. And even when 
                                                          
81 I will focus on blame judgments, which can be considered the 
paradigmatic moral judgment. See generally Steve Guglielmo, Andrew E. 
Monroe & Bertram F. Malle, At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology, 52 
INQUIRY 449 (2009). 
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harm occurs unintentionally, if the person could have and should 
have chosen a harm-avoiding alternate path but didn’t, blame 
applies. Hence, the concept of intentionality is a crucial ingredient 
of blame judgments.82 My colleagues and I have developed a 
working model of blame that prominently features the concept of 
intentionality and also integrates a number of well-supported 
features of blame.83   
B. A Step Model of Blame84 
People can be blamed for outcomes or behaviors. However, 
even in the case of outcomes, the agent is ultimately blamed for the 
behavior of causing, allowing, or failing to prevent the outcome. 
Thus, to streamline the presentation, I designate as the first step in 
the blame process the perceiver’s detection of a norm-violating 
behavior.85   
 
 
 
                                                          
82 Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Marc Hauser, The Role of Conscious 
Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment: Testing Three Principles of Harm, 
17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1082, 1083 (2006); Guglielmo, Monroe & Malle, supra note 
81, at 451; see generally ANTHONY KENNY, The History of Intention in Ethics, 
in THE ANATOMY OF THE SOUL: HISTORICAL ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
MIND 129 (1973).   
83 Guglielmo, Monroe & Malle, supra note 81, at 450–52. 
84 This is a “step” model of blame because several information processing 
elements build on each other and will often be temporally ordered. However, as 
with all complex information processes, backward loops, premature processing, 
and omissions can occur.  Moreover, the specific level of awareness that 
perceivers exhibit at each of these steps may vary. At least some of the time 
some of the steps will be conscious. 
85 When detection is direct perception of behavior (“This is wrong!” “This 
is forbidden!”), almost no cognitive work is needed; instead, we may see the 
operation of moral “intuitions” and “moral grammar rules.” See references to 
Haidt and to Mikhail, infra note 86. Such detection may come with automatic 
negative affect (e.g., anger, disgust) that may influence subsequent processing 
steps. Claims about such influence (and especially of undue bias) have been 
frequent but often rely on highly indirect evidence—researchers almost never 
distinguish the early norm-breach affect from the later blame-accompanying 
affect.  
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Figure 3.  Step model of ordinary assessments of blame.86   
 
                                                          
86 Guglielmo, Monroe & Malle, supra note 81, at 450–51. 
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The detection step may or may not be considered a genuine 
moral judgment yet,87 but it certainly is a necessary requirement of 
a genuine blame judgment. During the detection phase the 
perceiver focuses on evaluating the “badness” of the behavior; 
during the judgment phase the perceiver focuses on the 
blameworthiness of the agent. Put simply, people don’t blame 
behaviors, they blame agents.   
Blaming an agent requires assessing the agent’s mental states 
involved in the behavior. The key assessment here is the familiar 
question of whether the behavior was intentional or unintentional, 
which constitutes the next step in the model. This step is pivotal 
because it bifurcates the perceiver’s further information processing 
into two paths. In the case of intentional behavior (the left path in 
Fig. 3), the perceiver considers the agent’s particular reasons to 
act. In the case of unintentional behavior (the right path in Fig. 3), 
the perceiver considers the combination of the agent’s obligation 
and capacity to prevent the event in question.   
The reasons that the perceiver considers along the left path are 
the agent’s beliefs and desires that lead to her intention to act, 
indicating that once people determine that an agent intentionally 
breached a norm they want to know why she acted this way.88 
These reasons will strongly increase or decrease blame by way of 
justification. An agent who hurt someone intentionally may have 
had justified reasons (e.g., a dentist trying to extract a child’s 
unhealthy tooth) and will be blamed less than the one who had 
unjustified reasons (e.g., a schoolboy trying to provoke a fight). 
What reasons provide justification is of course a manner of 
community norms.  
                                                          
87 Many treatments of moral judgment do not clearly distinguish the norm-
violating phase from the blaming phase. Those that do vary in how much affect 
they postulate is involved in the early phase. Haidt argues there is much affect, 
Cushman as well as Mikhail argue that cognitive processes dominate. See Fiery 
Cushman, Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and 
Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment, 108 COGNITION 353, 375–78 (2008); 
Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist 
Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 817–19 (2001); John 
Mikhail, Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence and the Future, 11 
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 143, 143 (2007).  
88 See supra, Part I.C.1 on reason explanations.  
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The information that perceivers consider along the right path is 
quite different.  When people regard the agent as having acted 
unintentionally, they examine whether the agent should have 
prevented the event (obligation)89 and could have prevented it 
(capacity).90 Both of these considerations are tied to the 
intentionality concept. Social communities impose obligations on 
individuals because they expect them to intentionally act (or at 
least intend to act) in accordance with these obligations. If the 
agent lacks the requisite capacities to meet the obligations—
cognitive capacities such as knowledge or reasoning and 
noncognitive capacities such as skill or opportunity—little to no 
blame will apply. If the agent has the necessary capacities and is 
subject to the obligation, then a failure to prevent the negative 
event will trigger substantial blame. This blame will vary by how 
much the failure is considered imprudent, negligent, or reckless 
behavior, or possibly even an intentional, deliberate breach of 
one’s obligation.91  
This model has a fair amount of overlap with legal decision 
making in history and current practice—and this should not be too 
surprising given that the law codifies some basic human features of 
                                                          
89 For related discussion of these two elements, see The Significance of 
Intentionality, in INTENTIONS AND INTENTIONALITY, supra note 9, at 19–23. 
Obligation varies primarily with role, such as position within a hierarchy—see 
generally V. Lee Hamilton, Chains of Command: Responsibility Attribution in 
Hierarchies, 16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 118 (1986)—and type of relationship 
(e.g., stranger vs. friend). Jonathan Haidt, & Jonathan Baron, Social Roles and 
the Moral Judgment of Acts and Omissions, 26 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 201, 
202–04 (1996). 
90 This roughly corresponds to Weiner’s concept of controllability, which 
in his model is the critical precursor to responsibility judgments, which in turn 
foster blame (or sympathy). See generally BERNARD WEINER, JUDGMENTS OF 
RESPONSIBILITY: A FOUNDATION FOR A THEORY OF SOCIAL CONDUCT (1995). 
91 An intentional breach of one’s obligation is itself a norm violation and 
will be evaluated along the left arm of the step model: the perceiver now 
considers the agent’s justified or unjustified reasons for the breach. Perceivers 
may thus initially form a moral judgment about an agent’s unintentional causing 
of a negative outcome and end with a moral judgment about the agent’s 
intentional failure to prevent the outcome. For further discussion, see Steve 
Guglielmo & Bertram Malle, Can Unintended Side-Effects be Intentional? 
Resolving a Controversy over Intentionality and Morality, 36 PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. (forthcoming 2010).  
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moral judgment. For example, murder is typically defined as 
intentional killing, which requires both intentional “body 
movements” and the mental state of “intent to kill.”92  More 
generally, criminal responsibility is often defined as the pairing of 
a harmful act and the “corresponding mental state or intent.”93 But 
the overlap ends when the courts and the literatures of philosophy 
and law engage in disputes about the exact meaning of intention.94 
These disputes are often fanned by individual scholars’ intuitions 
about what intentionality is and they reflect historical and 
geographical variation in restricting or expanding the meaning of 
relevant terms (e.g., intentionally, willingly, and knowingly).95 By 
contrast, the advantage of an empirical-based model of moral 
judgment such as the step model is that the terms don’t have to be 
debated repeatedly, as they are fixed by ordinary people’s folk 
concepts of intentionality, intention, and the like.   
The main difference between the science of moral judgment 
and legal scholarship is that science typically focuses on a 
descriptive mission—clarifying the concepts and processes that 
guide people’s behavior—whereas the law focuses on a 
reformative mission (changing people’s thinking and behavior). 
Many legal and philosophical discussions, however, conflate the 
two missions by using ordinary words (e.g., intention) when they 
propose to reform people’s thinking or attempt to sharpen the 
meaning of terms in legal texts. When using ordinary words, the 
reformed or sharpened meaning will often clash with the words’ 
ordinary meanings (at least for those words that stand for a deeply 
ingrained folk concept, such as intention). Far better would be to 
introduce terms of art that, by steering clear of familiar folk 
concepts, may be more successful in shifting people’s thinking or 
                                                          
92 Stephen J. Morse, Craziness and Criminal Responsibility, 17 BEHAV. 
SCI. &  LAW 147, 148 (1999). 
93 Alan R. Felthous, Introduction to Mental Illness and Criminal 
Responsibility, 17 BEHAV. SCI. &  LAW 143, 143 (1999). 
94 See, e.g., R. ANTHONY DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY (1990); KENNY, supra note 82, at 129; Nicola Lacey, A Clear 
Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?, 56 THE MOD. L. REV. 621 (1993). 
95 See generally Justin D. Levinson, Mentally Misguided: How State of 
Mind Inquiries Ignore Psychological Reality and Overlook Cultural Differences, 
49 HOW. L.J. 1 (2005); Malle & Nelson, supra note 22, at 569–70. 
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attitudes.96   
Because I follow a descriptive mission here, the critical 
question now is this: Having in place a model of how people make 
blame judgments of individual agents, what do people do when 
they face a group agent’s immoral behavior? 
IV. MORAL JUDGMENT OF GROUP AGENTS 
There is broad agreement in the literature that a group’s 
capacity for intentional action is a prerequisite for the group’s 
status as a moral agent. As Isaacs put it, “showing that collectives 
are capable of intentional action is necessary for showing that they 
are appropriate objects of praise and blame.”97 The capacity to 
exemplify intentionality, mental states, and reason-based choice 
(rationality) is also what French postulates as central in rendering a 
corporation a “moral agent.”98 He argues that corporations are 
moral agents because they are capable of intentional action. These 
are claims about the metaphysics of corporations; however, they 
are in accordance with ordinary social perception. As we have seen 
in Part II, Section B, people regard as agents groups who act 
intentionally and have reasons for their actions. 
But the status of corporations and other group agents as 
intentional agents makes them only eligible for moral evaluation. 
What does such evaluation look like in detail? Does it work the 
same way as for the moral evaluation of individuals? We need not 
automatically assume that collective moral judgment operates the 
same way, but if there is no evidence to the contrary, we may 
continue to accept it as a working hypothesis. This equal-operation 
hypothesis is also strengthened by a basic theoretical argument. If 
people’s powerful folk psychology is unflappably applied to group 
agents, and if moral judgment is deeply drawing on folk 
psychology, then moral judgment, too, should be applied to group 
                                                          
96 Malle & Nelson, supra note 22, at 565. 
97 Tracy Isaacs, Collective Moral Responsibility and Collective Intention, 
20 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 59, 62 (2006). 
98 See Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. 
Q. 207 (1979). A revision of the postulate of corporations as moral agents is 
described in Peter A. French, Integrity, Intentions, and Corporations, 34 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 141 (1996).  
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agents.   
To test the equal-operation hypothesis in more detail, we need 
to examine the elements of the step model of blame and examine 
whether judgments of group action could be shuttled through a 
cognitive apparatus with those elements.   
A. Applying the Step Model of Blame to Group Agents 
A brief look into any newspaper reveals that people easily and 
often detect norm-violating group behaviors—performed, for 
example, by teams, gangs, corporations, parties, governments, or 
nations. The specific norms for groups may differ from those for 
individuals, but for the norms that do apply, moral breaches are 
certainly recognized and formulated.   
People also have no trouble distinguishing between intentional 
and unintentional group behavior.99 Unintentional collective 
behaviors may be less frequent than intentional ones,100 but acts of 
negligence (by definition unintentional) are commonplace in 
accusations of objectionable corporate behavior.  
Following the left path of arriving at blame in the step model, 
we know that people ascribe reasons to group agents, so we can 
expect people to consider reasons as possible blame moderators for 
norm-violating actions. A corporation or government will certainly 
offer such justifying reasons in order to mitigate potential blame 
for its actions. 
Following the right path of arriving at blame, the existence of 
norms for group agents implies that there are obligations for group 
agents as well, for being subject to a norm means being obligated 
to conform to it, and if there is a norm of prevention (especially of 
                                                          
99 It might seem that in Pettit’s model, Pettit in INTENTION IN LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 49, no unintentional behavior can be a genuine group 
action because the very decision process from reasons to intention are the 
prerequisites of his model of collective action.  However, a group decision 
process may have unintended consequences that one can ascribe to the group, 
which is then an unintentional behavior performed by the group. Once the group 
has demonstrated, through undergoing their appropriate decision process, that it 
is a genuine group agent, it can perform both intentional and unintentional 
behaviors.  
100 O’Laughlin & Malle, supra note 47, at 34.  
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harm), the obligation to prevent will fully apply.   
Furthermore, groups arguably vary in their capacities to 
prevent possible negative outcomes. They vary in their knowledge 
of certain facts as well as in skills and opportunities to execute 
certain intentions (to bring about or prevent outcomes). Ascriptions 
of knowledge (or lack thereof) to groups have been documented in 
Part II, Sections B and C, and variations in skills and opportunities 
are surely uncontroversial.  
Thus we arrive, without making contentious assumptions, at a 
picture according to which group agents can be blamed through the 
operation of the same cognitive apparatus through which 
individuals are blamed. We have no direct evidence that social 
perceivers form group blame following only these steps, but there 
are at least no apparent obstacles for them to do so. 
B. Ongoing Research 
In a recent experiment, Dillon and Malle gathered some 
evidence for people’s judgments of intentionality and blame in 
response to group agent behavior.101 University student participants 
considered a number of actions performed by individuals and 
groups and made a variety of judgments about those actions: “Was 
the behavior intentional?” “Did you detect what the agent was 
thinking?” “Does the agent deserve praise or blame?” The key 
measurements were participants’ rates of affirmative responses 
(indicating an inference of intentionality, thinking, or blame, 
respectively) and the response latency for those responses. 
Importantly, all actions were formulated in three ways: as 
performed by an individual, by an aggregate (e.g., inner city kids 
across the nation; students in the psychology class), and by a 
jointly acting group (e.g., the Latin Student Organization; the 
senior design team).102 The results suggested that both individual 
and group agents elicited similar and differentiated rates of 
inference (i.e., intentionality was inferred more frequently than 
                                                          
101 Kyle Dillon & Bertram F. Malle, Ease and Speed of Social Inferences 
from Individual and Group Behaviors (Sept. 2010) (unpublished data, Brown 
University) (on file with author). 
102 Each participant saw actions performed by all three groups, but never 
the three versions of the same action.  
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thinking, which was inferred more frequently than blame) and that 
speed of inferences were also remarkably similar across agents 
(with intentionality the fastest). The only noteworthy difference 
due to agent type emerged in the absolute frequency of 
intentionality inferences, where individual and jointly acting group 
agents elicited more affirmations of intentionality than did 
aggregate groups. However, when people did make those 
inferences, they accessed them equally fast.   
These results are only preliminary until we demonstrate 
consistency across stimulus properties and task demands. 
However, they do provide an indication that it is quite easy and 
natural for people to make mental inferences and moral judgments 
about group actions.  
V. THE MORAL LIFE OF GROUP AGENTS, LTD. 
A. Problems for Blaming Groups 
In light of the current evidence, we can be confident that 
people assign blame to group agents and do so with essentially the 
same psychological apparatus that they engage when blaming 
individual agents. But blame has two faces: the cognitive, on 
which I have focused, and the social, which so far I have set aside. 
This social face of blame consists of verbal or physical acts that 
express the perceiver’s moral judgment and are typically directed 
at the target agent, presumably for purposes of behavior regulation. 
Punishment may follow, and expressed blame is one kind of social 
punishment.103  
But here is the first problem: How well can social perceivers 
express blame toward group agents? People do not actually 
encounter nations, governments, or corporations; even teams or 
committees are rarely seen face to face. In modern life, people can 
write letters to a group agent, sue them, or publicly denounce them. 
But these expressions will be rare, limited in scope, and come with 
                                                          
103 A more intense social punishment is exclusion. For a review, see 
generally Rorbert Kurzban & Mark R. Leary, Evolutionary Origins of 
Stigmatization: The Functions of Social Exclusion, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 187 
(2001). 
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little assurance that the addressee actually notices the blame. 
The second problem is this: If blame is rarely expressed and 
even more rarely heard, regulation of group agents’ behavior runs 
idle. Of course, a social perceiver can vote against a government or 
refuse to buy from a company; but here she alters her own actions 
more than the group agent’s actions. Only when individual social 
perceivers aggregate or join together can social blame and 
punishment become an effective regulator. Thus, it often takes a 
group agent to fight or put in its place another group agent. 
A third problem was presented in Part II, Section C: If group 
agents lack affective mental states, they will also be unlikely to 
feel guilt, regret, or remorse.104 As a result, groups will have fewer 
moral scruples, which further blocks social regulation as well as 
deterrence. If groups are rational, solely cognitive agents, potential 
punishment becomes part of the utility calculation for their actions; 
anticipated guilt or regret lies outside these calculations. 
Fortunately there are boundaries to this bleak picture. As long 
as individual group members feel moral emotions and fear 
punishment, their influence on other members can alter group 
action. In this case, the locus of moral emotions is not the group 
agent but the individual who alters the decision making of the 
group agent. In the frame of Pettit’s model, individual members’ 
moral emotions can sway votes and lead to jointly adopted or 
rejected group reasons and intentions.105 Such a process requires an 
accessible and transparent structure and a manageable group size 
so that individuals can express their emotions and thereby 
influence others’ preferences and beliefs. Then the group can 
decide to forgo certain opportunities because they are morally 
objectionable. The group itself never instantiates guilt or raises a 
moral objection, but individuals do.   
                                                          
104 Strictly speaking we cannot currently determine whether group agents 
actually lack such feelings or are only perceived to lack them. For simplicity I 
will continue to use the objective formulation.  
105 See Pettit in INTENTION IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY,  supra note 49. 
Within individuals, the power of moral emotions is not radically different: the 
emotions sway the person’s decision making by changing desire and beliefs, 
making costs salient, or prospects unattractive. That the person feels the 
emotions ensures that those changes are executed.  
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B. Blaming Individual Group Members 
If blaming and punishing group agents is difficult or 
ineffective, people have the option of punishing individual group 
members.106 However, matters do not necessarily become easier 
here as individual group members may be viewed as differentially 
responsible for a group’s undesirable action and should therefore 
be differentially punished.107 But what guides such differentiation? 
The step model of blame may track the relevant factors. 
What will matter first is the degree to which the individual was 
causally contributing to the group action. After the team’s loss, 
substitute players are not subject to the same sanctions as starting 
players. The individual’s motivation or justification for committing 
the act will be assessed as well. Was he under pressure from the 
group or intrinsically motivated to achieve the specific outcome? 
Did she vote with the group majority or against it when the group 
action was adopted?   
The obligation of the individual in preventing the act will also 
be questioned: Is the citizen obliged to prevent the nation’s war? Is 
the worker obliged to stop the company’s discrimination?   
Capacities, too, will be of importance, both cognitive ones 
(how much did the person know?) and physical ones (how much 
ability did he have to actually avert the group action?).   
A final element is the level of identification or distancing that 
the group member displayed. If group membership is a choice (less 
so for nations than teams), then maintaining group membership 
counts as an endorsement of the group’s collective actions. 
Attempts to protest, to distance oneself from those actions, even if 
these attempts were squelched, will count in the individual’s favor. 
Conversely, happily going along with the group action when 
distancing was possible (but endorsement brought personal 
benefits) will count against the individual. A classic case of such 
complex assessments is the involvement of soldiers and citizens in 
the Holocaust. How much did the German and Austrian (and 
                                                          
106 See Tracy Isaacs, Individual Responsibility for Collective Wrongs, in 
BRINGING POWER TO JUSTICE?: THE PROSPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 167 (Joanna Harrington et al. eds., 2006).  
107 Paul Sheehy, Holding Them Responsible, 30 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 74, 
89–90 (2006).   
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Polish and French . . .) citizenry know about the Nazi command’s 
genocide? What could they have reasonably done to prevent it?  
What signs of endorsement or distancing can be documented?  
These are exceptionally difficult questions in their own right, 
but they are made even more difficult because people’s moral 
judgment apparatus has a single agent node and cannot easily 
handle multiple agents in intertwinement. Individuals are relatively 
easy to judge; perhaps group agents, too. But individuals as 
members of a group agent are not.   
CONCLUSION 
A considerable number of group agents are perceived as 
powerful, sometimes threatening, perhaps morally unregulated. 
Why? Humans have no trouble reasoning about the actions and 
minds of groups and have the desire to blame and punish them 
when they act immorally. But the ability and effectiveness to 
blame and punish groups is limited, particularly for 
institutionalized group agents (e.g., governments, corporations, 
committees). Moreover, such group agents rarely show the 
common emotions of fear, guilt, and remorse. All that fans 
people’s perceptions of group agents as threatening, powerful, and 
morally unalterable. It also causes deep frustration, which in turn 
may explain people’s growing distaste for corporations and the 
substantial damage awards in legal cases that punish large 
companies. Perhaps it also explains the political see-saw in most 
democratic countries, where the ideological tide switches in every 
other election, right after the last group agent was blamed for all 
the society’s ills.   
Thus, the modern world presents the human mind with group 
agents that trigger all the familiar social-cognitive and moral 
responses but that leave little room to act on those responses. 
Perhaps the law can provide some room for appropriate action—by 
codifying norms, obligations, and punishment not just for 
individuals but also for groups. In doing so, however, the law must 
heed the concepts and criteria by which ordinary people recognize 
group agents and judge their moral conduct. 
 
